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Abstract The spectacular progress in assisted reproduc-
tion technology that has been witnessed for the past thirty
years resulted in emerging new ethical dilemmas as well as
the revision of some perennial ones. The paper aims at a
feminist approach to oocyte and spare embryo donation for
research. First, referring to different concepts of autonomy
and informed consent, we discuss whether the decision to
donate oocyte/embryo can truly be an autonomous choice
of a female patient. Secondly, we argue the commonly
adopted language of gift is misleading and that calling for
altruism could put female patients at risk of exploitation.
Finally, we point out that the presence of gender stereo-
types in the procreative area casts doubt whether even a
more robust notion of informed consent manages to over-
come this risk.
Keywords Gender stereotype  Exploitation 
Oocyte and spare embryo donation for research 
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For the past thirty years we have been witnessing a spec-
tacular progress in assisted reproduction technology
(ART). It has been generally argued that women are greatly
benefited by ART, because it has enhanced their procre-
ative opportunities. The progress in ART has been
accompanied by a hot debate concerning its perspectives
and moral controversies. Nevertheless, even if in the last
years there have emerged several works whose authors
addressed the possible threats ART poses to women
(Carroll and Waldby 2012; Cohen 2007; Jayaprakasan
et al. 2007; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2011; Waldby
2008; Widdows 2010), these issues still have gained rela-
tively lesser interest than other aspects. In our paper we are
having a closer look at the problem of the forms of possible
coercion women undergoing ART may face. We are
especially interested in the pressure that could be placed on
women to donate their oocyte or fresh embryo for research
in the context of an IVF procedure. As far as ovum
donation is concerned, women are often asked to donate it
before their IVF cycle is completed because as stem-cell
scientists admit: ‘‘we know we need to get the eggs
immediately—we have to start the procedure within two
hours after the eggs are retrieved’’ (Braun and Schultz
2012, p. 144). Being aware of the fact that oocyte and
embryo donation is differently regulated by the national
laws (for instance the US vs. Spanish systems) and the fact
that in some countries this procedure is not allowed at all
(e.g. Germany or Austria) we would like to provide a
general view on some possible threats it posses to women
regardless of the particular legal setting.
In the majority of bioethical companions the beneficial
outcome of ART for patients is generally taken for granted
with only a very superficial awareness of the risks they
create for women in various aspects of their lives (e. g.
Fulford et al. 2002). The analyses in this field have been
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mostly focused on the problems concerning the moral
status of embryo, commercialization of oocyte market,
reproductive labour, economic situation of women donat-
ing their eggs a well as a close institutional and personal
integration of IVF and stem cell research fields (Braun and
Schultz 2012; Dickenson 2006; Goold and Savulescu 2009;
Haimes and Luce 2006; Haimes et al. 2008; Haimes and
Taylor 2009; Schubert 2013; Waldby 2008). The ethical
issues regarding somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) and
the moral status of the so-called research embryo have also
gained some interest (Agar 2007; Devolder 2005; Green
2002; Holm 2002). Although some forms of possible
exploitation and specifically coercion affecting women
undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF) have already been
recognized and discussed (Donchin 1996; Purdy 1996) the
majority of authors have pointed out only the fact that
women’s decision to undergo IVF may not necessarily
reflect their genuine needs. Apart from some notable
exceptions (Carroll and Waldby 2012; Haimes et al. 2012;
Scully et al. 2012; Waldby 2008), there has been almost no
debate concerning detrimental outcomes resulting from
IVF procedure offshoot that is oocyte and spare embryo
donation for stem cell research. As Donna Dickenson
notes, women often ‘‘become invisible in these proce-
dures’’ (Dickenson 2003, p. 143). A constant call to
investigate these problems coming from for instance bio-
ethical blogs (Albany Medical College. Bioethics Today.
2013) indicates that the problem of the possible adverse
effects for women consenting to donate their oocyte or
spare embryo has not been given an adequate coverage so
far. Moreover, it seems interesting to find that even if
potential health, financial and emotional risks caused by
egg and embryo donation are recognized, it is, neverthe-
less, claimed that properly obtained informed consent
provides a guarantee that the patient’s autonomy is suffi-
ciently secured (Haimes et al. 2013, p. 288; ASRM 2004,
2008).
It should be noted that in the process of gamete donation
both women and men can be coerced or exploited. For
instance, if male gametes were used against the donor’s
will, his rights would be violated in the same way as the
autonomy of a woman is disrespected when she is deprived
of her right to consent or refuse to gamete donation. In the
case of women, however, several additional factors con-
tributing to the higher level of potential exploitation should
be recognized. First, because female gametes constitute a
scarce medical resource and therefore their market as well
as research value is significantly high, some pressure to
donate them could be imposed on potential donors. Sec-
ondly, there are significant differences between procedures
of male and female gamete retrieval. In comparison to
sperm retrieval, the medical procedure of oocyte harvesting
creates a much greater health risk, let alone that it is also
extremely burdensome. It has been already acknowledged
that IVF procedures involving ovarian stimulation and
medical procedure of retrieving oocytes pose serious health
risks to women. One of the best-known disadvantageous
outcomes is ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS)
that provokes both short- and long-term health disorders
ranging from mild symptoms, like nausea or abdominal
distension to life-threatening problems, like renal failure,
or—as some findings recently suggested—ovarian cancer
(Haimes et al. 2013, p. 286; McLeod and Baylis 2007,
p. 468). However, the question is arising whether a woman
in fact acts against her interests or exposes herself to a
greater risk if she consents to donate spare oocytes or spare
embryos for research. Let’s suppose that instead of decid-
ing to have her spare oocyte or embryo frozen for possible
later use, she has donated them. So, if the IVF appears
unsuccessful, she will have to undergo the entire procedure
again. Therefore, it can be stated that spare gamete or
embryo donation is against her interest, because health
risks become greater. It should be added that increased
number of oocytes retrieval procedures means also greater
financial and psychological burdens on IVF patients. As far
as frozen embryo donation is concerned, it has been gen-
erally accepted that in the majority of cases the decision to
donate it does not affect well-being of IVF patients. It
could be, nevertheless, noted that also such a decision can
appear against IVF patient’s interests in case she changes
her mind and decides to have more progeny. With regard to
that point Dickenson has observed that women’s decision
of donation may not be autonomous because of two main
reasons: (1) the recognition of women’s role in egg or
embryo donation is clouded by gender stereotypes; (2) the
risks are not sufficiently spelled out (Dickenson 2003,
pp. 139–143). We will return later to the problem of gender
stereotypes. Now we are going to sketch out the general
background of the notion of autonomous decisions in
gamete donation.
Ambiguous as it is, the notion of autonomy has become
one of the fundamental concepts of bioethics. In his book
on autonomy, Gerald Dworkin indicated that there are
many understandings (and maybe misunderstandings) of
this notion and many words can serve as synonyms, e.g.
liberty, independence, freedom from coercion, to name just
a few most typically used. The idea of autonomy has its
proper place in the philosophical tradition, although—
paradoxically—one of the two most often claimed authors,
that is John Stuart Mill, hardly ever used the word
‘autonomy’. Nevertheless, it is him as well as Immanuel
Kant, who are typically referred to as the ‘fathers’ of the
idea. Of course, their accounts of autonomy differ pro-
foundly, with Mill pointing mainly to liberty as the right to
shape one’s life by his/her own independent choices and
Kant focusing on his idiosyncratic notion of autonomy of
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practical reason. It seems that bioethics, at least initially,
has been grounded first and foremost on Millan tradition.
It does not mean, however, that bioethicists have
unanimously agreed on the theoretical background of the
concept of autonomy. In her book Autonomy and Trust in
Bioethics, Onora O’Neill argues that it is neither Kantian
nor Millan account the bioethical use of the notion of
autonomy is based upon, but mainly the one provided by
twentieth psychology of character and moral development
(O’Neill 2002, p. 23). She claims so because in bioethics
the prevailing meaning of autonomy is that of indepen-
dence. Thus, the medico-moral principle of respect for
patient’s autonomy understood as patient’s independence is
the one the rule of informed consent has stemmed from. As
Neill Manson and Onora O’Neill put it: ‘‘informed consent
procedures protect individual choice, and with it individual
independence, hence individual autonomy’’ (Manson and
O’Neill 2007, pp. 18–19).
Also, Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp say: ‘‘informed
consent is rooted in concerns about protecting and enabling
autonomous or self-determining choice by patients and
subjects’’ (Faden and Beauchamp 1986, p. 235). Further-
more, two distinctive facets of this meaning of autonomy
should be recognized, namely autonomy of person and
autonomy of action, and it is the latter that has been
declared by them to be the conceptual basis of the notion of
informed consent. Faden and Beauchamp state that
autonomy of person could be defined as having capacities
to act consistently, independently, self-directedly and res-
istantly to any control by authorities (Faden and Beau-
champ 1986, p. 236). They stress that it is the distinction
between autonomous person and autonomous action that
has been generally overlooked in bioethical literature, and
indicate that even an autonomous agent may not act
autonomously unless some specific conditions are met.
They point out that ‘‘the capacity to act autonomously is
distinct from acting autonomously, and possession of the
capacity is no guarantee that an autonomous choice has
been or will be made’’ (Faden and Beauchamp 1986,
p. 237). In their view, there are three necessary conditions
for an action to be considered autonomous, namely the
agent must act intentionally, with understanding and
without controlling influences (Faden and Beauchamp
1986, p. 238). Given that the goal of informed consent ‘‘is
to enable patients and subjects (…) to make substantially
autonomous choices about whether to authorize a medical
intervention or research involvement’’ (Faden and Beau-
champ 1986, p. 237), it can be admitted that informed
consent meant as the operational rule of the principle of
autonomy apparently matches that interpretation.
It has been often criticized that Faden and Beauchamp’s
notion of informed consent is relatively narrow, and as such,
it seems insufficient to guard the patient’s autonomy
satisfactorily in medical setting. Focusing on the autonomy
of action rather than that of person, they in fact have iso-
lated decisions from the deciding person. Although it has
been presented as the general concept of autonomous
choice, in practice it has been reduced to a negative one, that
is, to the right to refuse a proposed treatment. To overcome
the weaknesses of this approach, it could be therefore
claimed that it ought to be rather autonomy of person than
autonomy of action upon which the rule of informed con-
sent should be based. Such a concept of autonomy has been
proposed by Dworkin in his The Theory and Practice of
Autonomy. Developing Harry Frankfurt’s concept of the
structure of the will (Frankfurt 1971), he says that ‘‘auton-
omy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons
to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences,
desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or
attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences
and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define
their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and
take responsibility for the kind of person they are’’
(Dworkin 1997, p. 20). In Dworkin’s view an autonomous
agent is characterized by the capacity of self-reflection that
allows him/her to give meaning to his/her life plans and
actions and to shape his/her life in accordance with accepted
moral values and principles. In that way he/she can be the
true author of the narrative of his/her life.
There is, however, a more fundamental disagreement
concerning the theory of autonomy. As Sonya Charles points
out, Dworkin’s view on autonomy presents a classic example
of a procedural concept of autonomy. Taking a feminist
approach in her paper How Should Feminists Autonomy
Theorists Respond to the Problem of Internalized Oppres-
sion?, she analyzes procedural and substantive concepts of
autonomy. As she observes: ‘‘Procedural theorists claim that
autonomy has to do with how a decision is made, not what
decision is made’’, that means that they ‘‘emphasize critical
reflection, authenticity, and content neutrality’’ (Charles
2010, p. 411). According to Charles, the core idea of the
procedural theory of autonomy is that it is the accordance
with an established procedure that makes a given decision
autonomous. A different approach is adopted in substantive
theories where some ‘‘additional criteria such as requiring
sufficient self-respect or self-worth or requiring specific
content of beliefs or preferences’’ are included (Charles
2010, p. 409). Moreover, she points out that in the procedural
theories exclusively subjective or ‘internal’ point of view is
taken into account, whereas in the substantive ones ‘‘non-
subjective criteria or certain ‘‘external’’ value judgments’’
are involved (Charles 2010, p. 409).
What seems especially important for the problem we are
dealing with is her opinion that the procedural approach to
autonomy overlooks the problem of internalized oppres-
sion, that is, the fact that some forms of socialization are
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pernicious. As Charles puts it ‘‘Internalized oppression is
internalized norms that lead a person to participate in
perpetuating her own oppression’’ (Charles 2010, p. 410, n.
6). Thus, the procedural approach adopting merely sub-
jective or internal perspective is seen not to be an adequate
angle from which you can decide whether some decisions
made by women are as autonomous.
The problem of a relationship between internal norms
and social ideals is very complex and should not be
reduced to a straightforward causal chain, nevertheless it
has been generally acknowledged that our attitudes and
choices are to much extent shaped by the process of
socialization. It has been recognized that people’s behav-
iour and self-awareness are highly influenced by stereo-
types, fixed opinions, prejudices and biases about
themselves, in other words by popular ‘theories’ people
encountered in the socialization process (Aronson 2011). In
that way some leading stereotypes could become real in
their effects.
Thus, the question arises which of these stereotypes
could be harmful. To address the question, feminist authors
argue the nonsubjective criteria must be employed. It
deemed necessary to detect internalized oppressive norms
resulting in nonautonomous preferences (Stoljar 2000;
Charles 2010). Charles holds that if a decision is implied
by false beliefs, it should not be treated as autonomous
(Charles 2010, p. 413). However, to recognize the false-
hood of a belief we need to step out from the internal
perspective and take some distanced external one.
We argue that a generally accepted opinion that women
are ‘by nature’ compassionate and caring is one of these
false beliefs. It can be traced to the psychological concepts
of Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg and Carole Gilligan. In
the classical works of Kohlberg a six-stage scheme of
moral development was presented (Kohlberg 1981). The
final stage of moral development is that of universal ethical
principles regarded as more fundamental than any institu-
tional norms and legal acts could ever be. At this level a
rational agent identifies himself with the set of norms and
values and does not need any externally imposed obligation
to respect them. In his theory, Kohlberg correlates episte-
mological and psychological development with moral
progress that starts with perception of others from egoistic
point of view and proceeds to rational, logically-based
recognition of justice (Kohlberg 1981, p. 180). Gilligan
criticized Kohlberg’s account as almost totally excluding
women. They become silent and invisible and, moreover,
judged according to the criteria based upon the empirical
study carried out on boys and men. In her well-known work
In a Different Voice Gilligan observed that performing
moral judgment girls/women try to take into consideration
the entire network of relationships they are involved in.
Therefore, when evaluated by Kohlberg’s criteria they
must be regarded as permanently unable to challenge
authorities and reach the level of abstractive and logical
moral reasoning. If judged according to Kohlberg’s crite-
ria, they rarely, if ever, manage to achieve the post-con-
ventional level, let alone the final stage.
Regardless of the argument that can be raised against it,
Kohlberg’s study has become the general pattern of human
moral development. When in her works Gilligan brought
‘‘into the masculine citadel of justice the feminine plea for
mercy’’ (Gilligan 2003, p. 105), she presented the feminine
moral development against the background constituted by
Kohlberg’s study. Analyzing the responses to different
moral dilemmas, Gilligan draws a conclusion that while for
men responsibility is identified negatively as the limitation
of their possibilities, women see it positively as a response
to others and as an act of care. In Gilligan’s comparison of
masculine and feminine morality we always encounter the
tension between ‘morality of rights’ supporting individual
claims and ‘morality of responsibility’ giving the priority
to relationships. Moreover, we can notice that the majority
of women Gilligan talked to appeared to be quite obsessed
by fear of being selfish, because in their understanding
selfishness remained in the strict opposition to responsi-
bility. At some stage of moral development their notion of
unselfishness becomes so demanding that in their view
anything less than self-sacrifice seems selfish. In Gilligan’s
opinion, it is only at the higher stages of feminine moral
development when responsibility could be separated from
self-sacrifice. She concludes that there are two different
models of moral maturity resulted from two different
developmental processes with feminine idea of maturity
noticeably shifted from the one depicted in Kohlberg’s
account. Comparing masculine and feminine notions of
maturity, we find the former focusing primarily on a
reflective understanding of human rights, and the latter
emphasizing ‘‘the world of relationships’’, Gilligan says
(Gilligan 2003, p. 167).
Both Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s studies have been crit-
icized and further research has not found any significant
differences between genders in their patterns of moral
development (Mullet 1988; Bartky 1990). In our view, the
evaluation of Gilligan’s findings first of all gives rise to a
fundamental question whether it is really the case that the
phenomena she has described are a cause rather than an
effect. It seems that Gilligan has ignored the tremendous
impact of gender stereotype ascribing altruism and
unselfishness to ‘feminine nature’. Founding her model of
feminine moral development on research carried out in the
70s of the twentieth century, she made her inquiries into
moral development on the group of women raised on the
cultural discourse that was ironically summarized by Vir-
ginia Woolf in her Killing the Angel in the House: ‘‘She
was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming.
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She was utterly unselfish. She excelled in the difficult arts
of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was
chicken, she took the leg; if there was a draught she sat in
it—in short she was so constituted that she never had a
mind or a wish of her own, but preferred to sympathize
always with the mind and wishes of others’’ (Woolf 1995,
p. 3).
Erik Malmqvist and Kristin Zeiler took a further step in
their view on the process of socialization resulting in
internalized norms. They argue that the problem lies not in
the fact that the agent fails to recognize the oppressive
norms she acts upon as false, but that she is unable to see
them at all, that is, to recognize them as the norms she is
motivated by. (Malmqvist and Zeiler 2010, p. 145). Taking
a phenomenological approach, Malmqvist and Zeiler base
their account of the problem of autonomy on Merleau-
Ponty’s theory of the lived body, and state: ‘‘that many
pervasive cultural norms are habitually incorporated’’
(Malmqvist and Zeiler 2010, p. 144) and as such elusive.
These norms work on the taken-for-granted level and do
not become the object of reflective analysis. Observing that
these norms ‘‘evade the sort of self-reflective scrutiny of
our motivational structure that is crucial to autonomous
agency’’ (Malmqvist and Zeiler 2010, p. 144), Malmqvist
and Zeiler admit, however, that even deeply incorporated
social norms should not be regarded as totally determining.
They draw the converse process of excorporation in which
the concealed oppressiveness are to be revealed and
reflectively pondered (Malmqvist and Zeiler 2010,
pp. 145–150), and argue that excorporation starts ‘‘a pro-
cess of changing pervasive norms, on an individual and
societal level’’ (Malmqvist and Zeiler 2010, p. 149).
However, it seems that the process does not go on easily
and it encounters many obstacles.
Although the latest research shows that there have
actually been some striking changes in social roles and
gender images caused by economic and social-cultural
transformations (Giddens 2009, 2012), there can be
observed that traditional gender images are still visible and
highly influential (Stivers 2002; Solinger 1998; Kukla
2008). It can be argued the models of moral development
depicted in Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s schemes have
become ‘real in their effects’, since—despite their flaws and
inadequacy—they continue to govern boys’ and girls’
upbringing, respectively. The gender models of upbringing
remain overwhelming, because they support traditional es-
sentialistic views on ‘masculine and feminine nature’, with
emphasis on independence and self-focusing of the former
and relationship involvement as well as self-sacrifice of the
latter. And vice versa: the differences in moral and social
upbringing petrify traditional feminine and masculine
attributes, women as sensitive, emphatic and eager to nur-
ture others’ needs and men as rather self-centered and
inclined to tend to their own self-development. All that
contributes to the fact that gender stereotypes die hard. The
fact that they become recognized or ‘excorporated’ does not
automatically imply that they are going to be refuted. Par-
adoxically, they happen to be even re-evaluated as the
source of ‘girl power’. Announcing the commencement of a
new matriarchy era, in The End of Men and the Rise of
Women Hanna Rosin recognizes the traditional set of fem-
inine attributes, like empathy, patience, flexibility and
communal problem solving as the main factor contributing
to their alleged present dominance (Rosin 2012).
It can be presumed that as choice-makers, female patients
could be put in a difficult position by their ‘imprinted altru-
ism’. As Dickenson has noticed, their situation is made even
more problematic by ‘the language of gift’ that is commonly
employed in the guidelines for oocyte donation and other
ART procedures (Dickenson 2003, p. 143). Also, Theresa
Glennon points out that ‘‘egg donation programmes
emphasize altruism (…) Their rhetoric focuses on egg
donation as a ‘gift’ exchange’’ (Glennon 2012, p. 101). The
idea of gift is prevalent in the entire ‘reproductive market’
and it is most strikingly reflected in ART online advertise-
ments always calling for altruistic help: ‘‘Give ‘the gift of
heart’ to a person in need’’ (Invicta); ‘‘Welcome to gift ov
life—setting egg donation standards’’ (Gift Ov Life); ‘‘We
recognize that your decision to be an egg donor is a tre-
mendous gift!’’ (Georgia Reproductive Specialists).
It seems that not only ART professionals are of the
opinion that such advertisements are persuasive because this
gender stereotype has influenced the laypeople’s views.
Even more startling is the fact that it has its impact on the
oocyte donation ethical guidelines which, as Dickenson
notes, ‘‘uniformly employ the ‘language of gift’’’ (Dicken-
son 2003, p. 143). What is even more conspicuous, that belief
is also shared by some professionals involved in philo-
sophical and ethical disputes. For instance, it could seem that
Cynthia B. Cohen in her book Renewing the Stuff of Life does
recognize disadvantageous outcomes faced by women
undergoing IVF. She points out that it is not only the question
of medical risks, but in the case of women asked to donate
their gametes for research it is also a question of possible
coercion. Nevertheless, she still presupposes that the value of
altruism is rewarding for women, saying: ‘‘Although women
who provide eggs for research receive the altruistic satis-
faction of knowing that they might assist others to overcome
serious disease, they gain such satisfaction only at some risks
to themselves’’ (Cohen 2007, p. 33).
In that way women become unwitting ‘victims’ of the set
of moral virtues typically ascribed to them. Given how
demanding the moral ideal set by these features is, it can be
argued that in some decisional contexts this model could
make women more susceptible to exploitation. Such a risk of
exploitation can emerge in the procedure of gamete donation
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where a female patient has to make a choice between con-
senting to donate gametes for research, which is perceived as
altruistic and therefore morally valued, or refusing to donate
them, which is seen as incompatible with feminine ‘caring
and empathic’ moral ideal and therefore morally flawed.
Thus, the choice the patient has to make is either to act in her
own interest and fail to match the moral ideal or to give
priority to the needs of others and come up to the supere-
rogative moral requirements. Ian Wilmut’s opinion seems to
leave no doubts which decision women are expected to
make: ‘‘I have never doubted that women would donate if
they thought we were helping people to have treatment. Our
hope and belief is that women who have seen the devastating
effect of this disease will be prepared to make such a dona-
tion’’ (Sample and MacLeod 2005).
In our opinion, even the most ‘robust’ guidelines for
informed consent do not solve the problem because of
some underpinning issues. Given the phenomenon of
incorporation we doubt whether even the most sophisti-
cated requirements of informed consent can protect women
from a camouflaged exploitation, because as Malmqvist
and Zeiler rightly put it: ‘‘certain cultural norms conceal
themselves and thus elude autonomous reflection’’
(Malmqvist and Zeiler 2010, p. 146). Also, Sonya Charles
points out that decisions relied on ‘‘internalized oppressive
norms’’ are not autonomous (Charles 210, p. 424).
Hence, it seems that it is very doubtful whether the
structure of autonomous will is so ‘free of traps’ as
Frankfurt seems to imply, saying that we are really free if
we want what we want to want (Frankfurt 1971, p. 17). We
claim that Frankfurt/Dworkin’s concept of the second order
desires may not reflect people’s genuine preferences and
wishes, but rather the ones determined by social and gender
stereotypes. The background the theory of the second order
desires has referred to seems to be falsified by some ide´es
rec¸ues of alleged women’s altruism, unselfishness, sym-
pathy and commitment to the needs of others. It seems that
the refusal of gamete donation for research stands in an
utter opposition to practicing moral virtues embedded in
that social and cultural image of a woman.
Thus, we think that even if the requirements matching
the more demanding version of the concept of informed
consent are adopted, it is still highly questionable whether
woman’s decisions, even if they reflect her second order
desires, are not clouded by the set of imprinted moral
virtues. To approach the case slightly perversely, we can
imagine a scenario where a woman’s first order desire is
not to donate her eggs or spare embryo for research. Once
she, however, reflects upon her first order desire, she finds
out that she should want to want to donate them. In this
scenario, paradoxically, it is rather ‘listening to her guts’
than referring to second order desires that properly reflects
her genuine will.
The very essence of moral life is an inevitable tension
between the quest for independence and the awareness of
being entwined in a network of relations. Literature abounds
with examples of feminine moral ideal that was so eloquently
articulated by Woolf. Regardless of what we think of femi-
nine and masculine moral ideals, this paper invites the
readers to reflect on such ways of modeling feminine attri-
butes that in a camouflaged way affect their decisions in the
realm of ART. Given that countless generations of women
have been brought up in accordance with the ideal of femi-
ninity described by Gilligan and criticized by Woolf, it seems
obvious that in the case of women the language of gift and
reference to altruism could be very persuasive.
In our opinion, only a genuine change of the dominant
discourse will be able to overcome the detrimental results
of these profound gender models that are in many cases
absorbed unreflectively. To begin the process of individual
and social changes the incorporated oppressive norms must
become excorporated. As Malmqvist and Zeiler point out
this process often commences with a sort of surprise when
something treated so far as obvious is challenged
(Malmqvis 2010, pp. 149–150). To end our paper with an
optimistic view, we point to the fact that such a shift in the
cultural narratives has been already unfolding in the mass-
media. Maybe Merida the Brave who is the first Disney’s
heroine to act individualistically, independently and ego-
istically can become the source of this elucidating surprise.
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